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Oppsummering 
Ved hjelp av et datasett uten overlevelsesskjevhet undersøker vi prestasjonen 
og prestasjonens persistens til norske aksjefond i perioden 2000-2010. For å evaluere 
prestasjonen til fondene bruker vi en multiperiodisk versjon av Carhart sin 4-
faktormodell for å estimere Jensens alfa. Vi vurderer den statistiske signifikansen av 
alfaestimatene ved å sammenligne dem med alfafordelinger generert fra bootstrap-
simuleringer. Vi finner at investorer totalt sett realiserer en netto risikojustert avkastning 
som er dårligere enn den risikojusterte avkastningen til referanseindeksen med omtrent 
den gjennomsnittlige kostnaden til fondene. Videre finner vi at forvaltere av fondene 
som presterer best har god evne til å velge aksjer, mens de dårligste fondsforvaltere 
både har dårlig markedstiming og velger dårlige aksjer. Avhengig av ulike statistiske 
metoder finner vi ulike nivåer av persistens i fondsprestasjonene. Når vi reevaluerer 
prestasjonen på månedlig basis, antyder de empiriske bevisene kortsiktig persistens 
blant toppfondene. Videre finner vi at prestasjonen til bunnfondene vedvarer 
signifikant i opp til ett år. 
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Performance and Persistence in
Norwegian Mutual Funds
Kristo↵er Gallefoss, Helge Ho↵ Hansen, and Eirik Solli Haukaas⇤
June 6, 2012
Abstract
Using a dataset free of survivorship bias, we investigate the performance
and performance persistence of Norwegian mutual funds in the period 2000-
2010. To evaluate mutual fund performance we apply a multi-period version
of the Carhart 4-factor model to obtain Jensen’s alpha. We assess the statisti-
cal significance of the alpha point estimates by comparing them to alpha dis-
tributions generated from bootstrap simulations. We find that mutual fund
investors in aggregate realize risk-adjusted net returns that underperform
the benchmark by approximately the fund fees. Additionally, the evidence
implies that the managers of the funds that lie in the right tail of the cross-
section of mutual fund alpha estimates inhabit stock-picking skills, while the
managers of the worst performing funds are both mistiming the market and
picking bad stocks. Depending on various statistical methodologies we find
di↵erent levels of performance persistence. When we reevaluate performance
on a monthly basis, our evidence indicates short-term persistence among su-
perior funds. Moreover, the performance of inferior funds strongly persists
up to one year.
⇤Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), NO-7491 Trondheim, Norway. We
especially thank Peter Molnar for his guidance, feedback and conversations that we have greatly
benefited from. Also, we thank Børsprosjektet NHH, Verdipapirfondenes Forening and Bernt A.
Ødegaard for generously providing us with the data.
1 Introduction
The question whether actively managed funds are able to outperform their bench-
marks, and if the managers of these funds inhabit superior skills, has been addressed
in many papers. This attention is justified, considering the importance of the ques-
tion in both academics’ and investors’ point of view. For academics, it is important
since the existence – and persistence – of managerial skills would support a rejec-
tion of the semi-strong form of the e cient market hypothesis, as defined by Fama
(1970). As for investors, it is in their interest to know whether investing in actively
managed funds is worth the extra cost compared to investing in low-cost passive
funds, and if so, which type of funds they should invest in.
Early research, starting with Jensen (1968), concludes that mutual funds are
outperformed by a comparable passive market proxy when accounting for the funds’
managing cost. Later academic studies, like Ippolito (1989), find that mutual funds
are able to generate enough excess returns to o↵set the fees they charge. Sharpe
(1991) argue that the average return before fees on actively managed financial
portfolios must equal the return on passive portfolios in order for the market to
clear, according to the equilibrium accounting theory. Indeed, most of the studies
have shown little evidence that the aggregate mutual fund industry adds value to
investors in terms of superior performance. Obviously, this does not mean that
all the funds deliver average or below average performance. In most cases, some
funds will perform well, whereas other funds will perform poorly. Therefore, two
additional questions arise. The first address whether the di↵erences in performance
can be attributed to chance, or if it is due to managerial skill [as discussed in Cuth-
bertson et al. (2008)]. Second, if skilled managers exist, the question is whether
performance persists – i.e. if mutual funds with an above (below) average perfor-
mance in the last period also will have an above (below) average performance in
the next period.
There are several studies on persistence in mutual fund performance. Hendricks
et al. (1993) find that funds exhibit persistence over short time horizons, denoting
the e↵ect as hot hands. Carhart (1997) argues that the hot hands e↵ect is mostly
driven by the one-year momentum e↵ect of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and finds
no evidence of performance persistence after controlling for the momentum e↵ect.
A more recent paper by Berk and Green (2004) provide evidence that abnormal
returns persist in mutual funds over short time horizons. In the long run, however,
they find that the funds do not outperform passive benchmarks. They conclude
that there exists managerial talent capable of generating abnormal returns, but
this talent is o↵set in the long run by fund inflows that lead to diminishing returns
to scale. Teo and Woo (2001) find that the performance of losing funds strongly
persist for up to 6 years. Furthermore, Kosowski et al. (2006) applies a bootstrap
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analysis (rather than the standard t-test) to evaluate the significance of the fund
persistence and find that performance does indeed strongly persist among the top
performing funds.
Most academic studies on mutual funds are done on the US market due to the
importance of the market and the data availability. There have been an increasing
amount of studies of mutual funds in European countries since the 90s. Otten and
Bams (2002) present a comprehensive study of European mutual funds (with a
database of 506 mutual funds from five countries). In contrary to most US studies,
their findings suggest that mutual funds are able to add value. In particular, four
out of five countries exhibit significant out-performance at an aggregate level when
management fees are added back. When it comes to persistence in performance,
however, they find only weak evidence in all countries except the UK. A more recent
study from the US, Bollen and Busse (2005), conclude that persistence in perfor-
mance is a short-lived phenomenon that can only be measured using relatively short
measurement windows. That is, investigating persistence using monthly data, like
the before-mentioned studies, is unlikely to produce significant results. Therefore,
whenever possible, more frequent data should be used.
Considering the fact that the Norwegian economy is one of the most developed
in the world in terms of GDP per capita, Norwegian mutual funds are certainly
a subject of interest. In spite of this, there are few academic studies on the Nor-
wegian mutual fund market. The only research known to us is the unpublished
work of Sørensen (2009) and Sandvik and Heitmann (2010), which investigate the
performance and persistence in Norwegian mutual funds between 1982-2008 and
1993-2009, respectively. Both of them find that the aggregate mutual fund indus-
try in Norway does not exhibit abnormal performance. Regarding persistence in
performance, both papers conclude that there is no persistence for either superior
or inferior performers. However, these studies use monthly data, in contrary to
the argument presented by Bollen and Busse (2005). Therefore, finding evidence
of persistence is less likely.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the performance and persistence in
Norwegian mutual funds. To do this we use a survivorship bias-free database that
consist of 64 actively managed domestic funds with daily returns from January
2000 to December 2010.
We apply both unconditional and conditional versions of the Carhart (1997)
4-factor model to evaluate whether funds exhibit superior or inferior performance.
As we find that the factor loadings vary significantly with time, we reevaluate the
factor loadings on a yearly basis to better estimate the funds’ performance. This
results in a multi-period version of the 4-factor model. Adopting the method of
Fama and French (2010) and Kosowski et al. (2006), we perform bootstrap analyses
to determine the significance of the results. Furthermore, we investigate whether
3
managerial skills, if present, are due to stock-picking or market timing ability.
Managers with stock-picking ability are successfully predicting whether particular
securities perform better than others, while those with market timing are predicting
where the general market is going. An active fund manager may inhabit either one
of these abilities, or a combination of the two.
Persistence in performance is assessed by various statistical methodologies.
First, we evaluate the performance potential of investment strategies that seek to
exploit short-term persistence, a method adopted from Hendricks et al. (1993). We
use relatively short measurement periods from one month to two years to evaluate
persistence. As argued by Bollen and Busse (2005), this identifies top and bot-
tom performers more precisely. Second, we check for performance persistence by
performing a series of nonparametric tests, both in a two-period and multi-period
framework. Two-period tests compare the ranking of funds over two consecutive
periods. Specifically, we check whether the winners (losers) of the last period are
also the winners (losers) in the next period [similar to the method of Carhart (1997)
and Karoui and Meier (2009)]. For the multi-period test, where more than two con-
secutive periods are considered, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, as described
by Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009).
Note that there is a fundamental di↵erence between the persistence tests. The
first method creates a portfolio that is long in the superior performers and short
in the inferior performers from the last period. The aggregate risk-adjusted return
from this strategy determines whether such a portfolio delivers abnormal returns
relatively to the benchmark given by the 4-factor model. The nonparametric tests
rank winners and losers relatively to all the funds in the sample. Thus, it measures
performance persistence relative to other funds and it cannot conclude whether
either winners or losers perform better than the market benchmark.
We find that the Norwegian mutual funds in aggregate deliver negative risk-
adjusted returns. The size of this aggregate return is comparable to the average
expense level charged by the funds, which is consistent with the equilibrium ac-
counting theory of Sharpe (1991). The funds that lie in the right tail of the cross-
section of alpha estimates are generating abnormal returns that, according to our
bootstrap analyses, cannot be explained by luck alone. Our evidence implies that
the managers of these funds have skills attributable to stock-picking ability. We
find that the worst performing funds are realizing significant negative abnormal
returns that seem to be explained by a combination of poor stock-picking ability
and poor market timing ability. Furthermore, we find di↵erent level of performance
persistence depending on the statistical methodologies we use. The nonparametric
tests reveal that there is short-term persistence among superior funds for the entire
sample as well as among individual funds. We conclude from both the parametric
and nonparametric tests that the performance of the worst funds strongly persists
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up to one year. This coincides with the findings of Bollen and Busse (2005).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives an overview
of our data set and provides some descriptive statistics of the Norwegian mutual
funds and our benchmarks. Section 3 consists of three parts. In the first two parts,
we describe the performance model and the bootstrap method. In the third part,
we present the results on mutual fund performance and discuss the presence of
market timing and stock-picking ability amongst fund managers. Section 4 tests
for persistence in mutual fund performance. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Norwegian Mutual Funds
Our database contains daily net asset values (NAV) per share of 64 Norwegian
actively managed open-end equity funds from January 2000 to December 2010.
This is obtained from Børsprosjektet NHH, which is administered by the Norwe-
gian School of Economics. The NAV include reinvestment of all distributions (e.g.
dividends) and are net of expenses, but disregard load charges and exit fees. In ag-
gregate, these 64 funds represented 74% of the total fund industry in Norway as of
December 2010.1 We restrict our sample to domestic equity funds with at least 36
months of data. That is, we exclude funds that invest in bonds, sectors and indices,
as well as equity funds that invest more than 20% of their assets internationally.
We calculate the fund returns as follows:
ri,t = ln
NAVi,t
NAVi,t 1
(1)
where NAVi,t is the net asset value of fund i at day t and ri,t is the return of fund
i at day t.
As shown by for instance Brown et al. (1992), survivorship bias in a sample
can severely a↵ect the results. That is, if funds that are shut down or merged
into another one within the sample period are excluded from the sample data, an
overestimation of the average performance may occur. This is due to the fact that
those funds that are shut down often are those with poor performance. Therefore,
we include funds that have been terminated, and started, within the sample period,
thus avoiding the survivorship issue in our dataset.
Additionally, we have monthly data on asset under management (AUM), inflow
and outflow for each fund for the entire time period. This data is obtained from
the Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association.2
1Statistics Norway
2Verdipapirfondenes Forening
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Table 1
Mutual Fund Database Summary Statistics
This table reports the number, total asset under management (AUM), returns and per-
formance of Norwegian open-end equity funds in the period 2000-2010. Specifically, the
first column of this table reports the number of funds in existence in each year. The
second (third) column reports the number of funds that started (liquidated) during each
year. The fourth column reports the total asset under management (in million NOK) in
the 64 mutual funds at the end of each year. The fifth column reports the excess return
calculated as the return of the equally weighted portfolio excess of the risk-free rate in
percent per year. Column six reports the unconditional 4-factor model alpha in percent
per year for the equally weighted portfolio of funds for each year.
AUM
(End of Year, MNOK)
Excess Return of
Equally Weighted
Portfolio
4-Factor Alpha of
Equally Weighted
Portfolio
Number of funds
Year End of year Born Liquidated
2000 51 6 0 26,960 8.69% 1.95%
2001 54 3 0 22,936 3.57% -5.02%
2002 60 6 0 15,615 -8.73% -16.20%
2003 60 1 1 23,268 8.18% -2.70%
2004 58 0 2 27,280 -0.49% -2.34%
2005 56 0 2 33,508 -2.87% 0.89%
2006 53 3 6 44,137 -0.25% 0.16%
2007 52 0 1 46,443 3.37% -2.19%
2008 52 0 0 22,146 2.68% -14.35%
2009 52 0 0 48,362 12.77% 15.12%
2010 52 0 0 59,483 6.41% 4.22%
2.2 Benchmarks
We construct the daily excess market return by deducting the Oslo Stock Ex-
change All-Share Index (OSEAX) from the Norwegian 3-month Treasury bill index
(ST1X), both obtained from Ecowin Reuters. The time-series of daily returns for
the remaining factors of Carhart’s 4-factor model, i.e. the size, book-to-market and
momentum factor, are acquired from Professor Bernt Arne Ødegaard. These risk
factors are constructed using stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange (Næs et al., 2009).
SMB is the returns of a portfolio that has a long position in small companies and
a short position in large companies, while HML is the returns of a portfolio that is
long in companies with high book-to-market value and short in companies with low
book-to-market value. The momentum factor, identified by Jegadeesh and Titman
(1993), is constructed by ranking stocks based on their prior 11-month return and
sorting them into three portfolios. Then, the portfolios are held for one month, be-
fore they are rebalanced again according to the past return. The return di↵erence
between the top third portfolio return and the bottom third portfolio return is the
PR1YR factor.
The OSE All-Share Index is plotted in Figure 1 together with the equally
weighted fund portfolio. The aggregate return of the market index is 31 % higher
than the aggregate return of the equally weighted portfolio. Additionally, Figure 1
displays the returns of the equally weighted portfolio of funds that is terminated
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within the sample period. We observe that the portfolio of dead funds have lower
returns than the portfolio including all funds. This illustrates that survivorship
bias would be present in the dataset if the defunct funds were to be excluded.
We use time-series of returns for oil price, 3- and 12-month Treasury bill (ST1X
and ST5X, respectively), and 12-month Norwegian Inter Bank O↵ered Rate (NI-
BOR) as explanatory variables in the conditional model in the next section. These
time-series are obtained from Ecowin Reuters.
Table 2
Performance Measurement Model Summary Statistics
MKT is the market return (given by the OSEAX) excess of the risk-free rate (given by the
ST1X). SMB and HML are returns of the factor mimicking portfolios for size and book-
to-market equity of Fama and French (1992). PR1YR is the factor-mimicking portfolio
for one-year return momentum. Column one reports the yearly average return of the four
portfolios. The second column reports the standard deviation of the return per year for
each portfolio. Column three to six reports the correlations between the factor portfolios.
Factor Yearly Average Standard Correlations
Portfolio Return Deviation MKT SMB HML PR1YR
MKT 4.86% 24.51% 1
SMB 11.38% 21.43% -0.70 1
HML 8.32% 21.37% -0.28 -0.08 1
PR1YR 3.71% 19.16% -0.06 0.07 0.09 1
7
Figure 1. Return development of the OSE All-Share Index and the equally
weighted portfolio of all funds and dead funds. The figure illustrates the returns of
the OSEAX and the equally weighted portfolio of all 64 funds, in addition to the equally
weighted portfolio of the funds that are terminated within the sample period.
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3 Performance
In this section, we investigate whether Norwegian mutual funds exhibit performance
excess of what could be expected by the given level of risk in the fund portfolios. To
answer this, we first seek out the most appropriate model to evaluate performance.
Further, we turn to simulations that use fund returns to infer the existence of skills,
or lack thereof, among fund managers. Finally, we investigate whether these skills,
if existent, are due to market timing abilities or stock-picking abilities.
3.1 Mutual Fund Performance Models
We employ both unconditional and conditional versions of the Carhart (1997) 4-
factor model. This section briefly describes these models, and evaluates their per-
formance estimates on the equally weighted portfolio of our dataset.
3.1.1 The Unconditional 4-Factor Model
First presented by Sharpe (1964), the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is a
basic model to explain variability in returns for a given asset. The intercept of the
regression model, ↵, gives us Jensen’s alpha, which is interpreted as a measure of
performance relative to the market. The model is formulated as:
ri,t   rf,t = ↵i +  i (rm,t   rf,t) + ✏i,t (2)
where ri,t is return of fund i in period t, rf,t is the risk-free rate of return in period
t, rm,t is the market return in period t and ✏i,t is the error term. The market return
excess of the risk-free rate is the market risk premium and  i is the exposure to the
market risk for fund i. In particular, if ↵ is significantly positive the fund manager
is able to earn returns which are higher than one could expect from the given
level of riskiness of the portfolio, according to the model. Opposite, a negative ↵
indicates poor performance by the fund manager.
Prior to the 90s, the CAPM was the most common model in academic research
to measure mutual fund performance. However, in addition to the market risk,
there are other well-known additional risk factors in the stock market. These factors
are often used by fund managers as stated investment strategies. To explain co-
variation between fund returns and these risk factors, the model can be expanded to
a multi-factor asset-pricing model. There exists an abundance of di↵erent proposed
factor models. However, the 4-factor model of Carhart (1997) is the most common
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in financial literature. The model is specified as follows:
ri,t   rf,t = ↵i +  iMKTMKTt +  iSMBSMBt +  iHMLHMLt
+  iPR1Y RPR1Y Rt + ✏i,t (3)
where MKT is the market risk premium, SMB is the small-minus-big size factor,
HML is the high-minus-low book-to-market factor, PR1Y R is the prior one-year
momentum factor, and  iMKT , iSMB , iHML, iPR1Y R is asset i’s exposure to
the MKT, SMB, HML, and PR1YR factor, respectively. The error term ✏i, has
expectation of zero and represents the risk that is unrelated to any of these fac-
tors. Carhart (1997) finds that the explanatory power of the 4-factor model is
significantly higher than the CAPM. Additionally, the 4-factor model explain asset
pricing without the risk of over-explaining by adding factors that exhibit signifi-
cance only as a result of data-mining, and thus risking the possibility of committing
serious pricing errors (Ghysels, 1998).
To gain some insight whether the 4-factor model is appropriate for our use,
we estimate the factor loadings for the equally weighted portfolio and each indi-
vidual fund. The result is that the Norwegian mutual fund market in aggregate
is not loading heavily on any of the three factors SMB, HML and PR1YR. This
observation is natural considering that that the three factors are constructed as the
return of holding a long and short position in stocks with certain characteristics
(i.e., small-minus-big, high-minus-low, and prior winners-minus-prior losers). In
order for the market to clear, investors must hold both positions. For instance, it
is likely that some fund managers must hold non-momentum stocks, since all fund
managers cannot hold the top-momentum portfolio. Thus, we observe that the ag-
gregate mutual fund market (i.e. the equally weighted portfolio) exhibit near-zero
coe cients. The regressions on each of the 64 funds reveal that the factor loadings
for the SMB, HML and PR1YR indeed vary across funds (see Table 3). Therefore,
the 4-factor model seems to be appropriate to evaluate mutual fund performance.
Table 3
Summary of Factor Loadings for Individual Funds
The table gives an overview of the factor loadings (betas) on individual funds. The first
column reports the average load in each of the four benchmark portfolios. The second
and third column reports the minimum and maximum load for the 64 funds, respectively.
The fourth column reports the cross-sectional standard deviation of the factor loadings.
Standard
Average Load Minimum Load Maximum Load Deviation
MKT 0.936 0.690 1.113 0.078
SMB 0.009  0.107 0.222 0.075
HML 0.003  0.069 0.116 0.031
PR1YR  0.050  0.135 0.036 0.036
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3.1.2 The Conditional 4-Factor Model
When applying the unconditional 4-factor model to eleven years (2000-2010) of data
on fund returns, one makes the assumption that funds have a constant exposure
to the risk factors in the model. In other words, using this single-period model
one assumes that the funds’ investment styles remain the same throughout the
whole sample period. When analyzing actively managed funds we could expect
this assumption to be wrong. That is, general macroeconomic tendencies could
influence a fund manager to change the exposure to the risk factors. For example,
a manager might evaluate his portfolio holdings di↵erently in a bull market than in
a bear market. Likewise, if a fund manager expects a promising future for a specific
small business, the exposure to the SMB factor would not remain unchanged if the
manager buys a considerable portion of stocks from that firm.
By further questioning underlying assumptions of standard performance mod-
els, we analyze our sample using a conditional model. If manager actions are based
on the state of the economy and are conditional on publicly available information,
standard models may produce spurious results (Ferson and Schadt, 1996). The
conditional 4-factor model can be specified:
ri,t   rf,t = ↵i +
X
j
 i,jrj,t +  
0
iZt 1MKT + ✏i,t (4)
Here, Zt 1 is a vector of information available at time t   1, and  0i is a vector
of response coe cients of the conditional beta with respect to the instruments in
Zt 1. Thus, the time-varying beta  i,t =  iMKT +  0iZt 1, is a linear relation
between the average beta and the conditional instruments.
Specifically, conditional models seek to measure the variation of betas with
time using some information vector that managers may use as a decision tool when
adjusting fund portfolios. Previous papers [see for example Otten and Bams (2004),
Bhuvaneswari (2011), and Barras et al. (2010)] introduce variables such as the T-
bill rate, market dividend yield, interest term structure, lagged market returns
and other macroeconomic variables. We test whether the aggregated mutual fund
portfolio’s market exposure depends on lagged market return, interest spread (12-
month ST5X less the ST1X), oil price, and the 12-month NIBOR interest rate.
We do not find that the conditional model improves significantly in terms of
R-squared. The market beta is very sensitive when combined with the oil price
and NIBOR factors, which has implications for the interpretability of the model.
The 12-month NIBOR has some explanatory power, but it does not contribute
significantly to the goodness of fit of the model. Moreover, the economic significance
of the 1-year interest factor is marginal, attributable to the relatively small factor
return. A conditional model would be of much greater use if we know the variables
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on which the managers trade upon. Sta↵ changes and other non-economic variables
might a↵ect portfolio decision-making, information that is not easily obtainable.
Without further information on funds’ trading decisions, we conclude that the
presented conditional model does not add more insight to performance than the
unconditional model presented in the preceding section. For details, see Appendix
1.
3.1.3 The Multi-Period Unconditional 4-Factor Model
Performing regressions on a year-to-year basis, instead of the entire sample, al-
lows for betas to vary on a yearly basis independent of conditional information
and should therefore provide more accurate results.3 The multi-period model is
expressed as follows:
ri,t = ↵i,k +
X
j
 i,j,k rj,t + ✏i,t (5)
where ↵i,k is alpha of fund i in year k and  i,j,k is the coe cient of risk factor j
for fund i at year k for every year k 2 [2000 : 2011]. Further, rj,t is the return on
the risk factor j at day t. The average multi-period alpha is calculated as:
↵i =
P
i
↵i,k
k
(6)
Because we regress on logarithmic returns, this average alpha will have the same
interpretation as the alpha for the single-period model.
The multi-period unconditional model must not be confused with conditional
models where factor betas vary with some variables. It is constructed as the single-
period unconditional model, only that we are allowed to regress on shorter time
intervals and still get reliable results, due to daily data. By construction, the multi-
period model will have a closer fit with the observed fund returns than the single-
period model, which increases explanatory power. We find that the funds’ factor
coe cients change quite substantially throughout the period 2000-2010. This is
evident from Figure 2, which illustrates how each factor loading vary through time
for a selection of funds. Thus, assuming constant beta coe cients over the whole
sample period will most likely provide biased results. Considering that the trading
dynamics of a fund might change over the course of 11 years, we conclude that it is
appropriate to apply a multi-period version of the unconditional four-factor model
when evaluating fund performance.
3We choose a yearly evaluation of fund performance since fund managers are usually measured
on yearly performance by the public and their superiors (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997).
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Figure 2. Development of the factor loadings through the sample period. The
figure shows the four factor loadings for fund number five each year in the sample (see
Appendix 10 for the list of funds). The fund is randomly chosen to illustrate how the
factor loadings vary through time. All the funds show time-varying tendencies. The
middle point in each vertical line is the point estimate of the factor loading at the given
year, while the vertical lines provide the 95% confidence interval of the estimate. See
Appendix 10 for an overview of the funds in our sample.
3.2 The Bootstrap Method
When analyzing mutual fund alphas using the OLS approach, one assumption is
that the residual vector from the estimation has a normal distribution. There are
several properties that would lead to a rejection of these assumptions. First, in-
dividual stocks within a portfolio often yield returns distributed with significantly
di↵erent skewness and kurtosis compared to a normal distribution. The central
limit theorem implies that an equally weighted portfolio of non-normal and inde-
pendently distributed stocks will approach a normal distribution. However, returns
are usually cross-correlated, and fund managers also do not always hold balanced
portfolios. Thus, fund portfolios usually exhibit non-normal returns. Second, finan-
cial assets often exhibit heteroscedastic variance. Third, individual stocks exhibit
varying levels of time-series autocorrelations in returns. Finally, funds may imple-
ment dynamic strategies that involve changing their levels of risk-taking when the
risk of the overall market portfolio changes, or in response to their performance
ranking relative to similar funds. Because each of the above-mentioned irregulari-
ties can contribute to non-normally distributed residuals, the normality assumption
could lead to invalid alpha t-statistics in an OLS-estimation.
To provide more accurate levels of precision in our analyses of performance,
we perform residual resampling simulations to better address the complex nature
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of financial data. As shown by e.g. Horowitz (2003), Fama and French (2010),
Bickel and Freedman (1984), Kosowski et al. (2006) and Hall and Martin (1988),
the bootstrap method gives a more accurate assessment of the significance levels of
the alphas. That is, the bootstrap can significantly decrease the di↵erence between
true and nominal probabilities of correctly rejecting a given null hypothesis (i.e.,
that no superior fund managers exist). For example, by recognizing the presence
of thick tails in individual fund returns, the bootstrap does not reject abnormal
performance among mutual funds as often as the standard t-test.
Furthermore, consider a distribution of residuals obtained from a parametric
regression on an individual fund’s returns. This distribution may or may not be
normally distributed. When modeling the mixed distribution of mutual fund resid-
uals we cannot assume normality in the distribution. It must be treated as a
complex, unique distribution based on two properties: heterogeneous risk-taking
across funds, and individual non-normalities in individual distributions of residuals
(Kosowski et al., 2006). A mixed distribution of two individual residual distri-
butions with di↵erent standard deviations will not be normal, even if the two
distributions are normal themselves. Consider a selection of funds with hetero-
geneous levels of risk such that, across funds, residual variances range uniformly
between 0.5 and 1.5 (i.e., the average variance is 1). In this case, the tails of
the cross-sectional distribution of residuals are now fatter than those of a normal
distribution. The intuition here is clear: As we move further to the right in the
right tail, the probability of these extreme outcomes does not fall very quickly, as
high-risk funds more than compensate for the large drop in such extreme outcomes
from low-risk funds. Given the intractability of parametrically modeling the mixed
distribution of such mutual fund estimations across 64 funds, the bootstrap is a
very attractive approach to use in analyzing a cross-section of mutual funds. For
an illustration of the non-normal implication of the mixed distribution, see Ap-
pendix 2. The remainder of this sub-section will explain the implementation of the
bootstrap method.
We seek to derive the combined distribution of alphas under the null hypothesis
of zero alpha (Berk and Green, 2004). To obtain this, we save the residuals from
the 4-factor regression in a vector ✏i,t = [✏i,1...✏i,T ] for each individual fund. Then
we generate 10,000 new random sets of returns based on the true data, but with
randomly selected residuals from the vector ✏i,t, where the alpha is equal to zero
by construction:
rbi,t =
X
j
 i,j,k rj,t + rand(✏i,t) (7)
where b is the bootstrap index, and rand(✏i,t) is a residual resampling. This ensures
a random distribution of residuals. Finally, this pseudo-time series is regressed on
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the Carhart(1997) four factors, obtaining an alpha estimated from simulated data:
rbi,t =
f↵bi +X
j
 i,j,k rj,t + rand(✏i,t) (8)
Repeating the above steps across all funds i = 1, ..., N , we arrive at a draw from the
cross section of bootstrapped alphas. Repeating this for all bootstrap iterations,
b = 1, ..., 1, 000, we then build the distribution of these cross-sectional draws of
alphas, {↵i, i = 1, ..., N}, or their t-statistics, {ti, i = 1, ..., N}, that result purely
from sampling variation while imposing the null of a true alpha that is equal to zero.
Percentiles from this distribution are used for statistical inference. For example, a
bootstrapped distribution of the top decile portfolio is obtained by extracting the
top decile alphas from each b-th iteration.
3.3 Results and Interpretation of Fund Performance
The previous sections suggested that the multi-period unconditional 4-factor model
is an appropriate model to investigate fund performance, and that the bootstrap
method is appropriate to evaluate the statistical significance of the performance4.
Therefore, the results from the multi-period model will be the focus in what follows.
However, for comparative purposes, we perform regressions on the equally weighted
portfolio and each individual fund using both the single-period and multi-period
unconditional 4-factor model and briefly comment on the di↵erences.
3.3.1 Aggregate Mutual Fund Performance and Distribution of Alphas
for Individual Funds
We find that the aggregate mutual fund market in Norway delivers a yearly alpha
of -1.903% (-0.725%) on average using the multi-period (single-period) model. The
yearly average management fee on the Norwegian mutual funds is approximately
1.69%, excluding performance fees.5 Comparing these numbers to the alpha of
-1.903%, it seems that the aggregated fund market is delivering approximately
zero alpha before fees. These results coincide with the equilibrium accounting
theory presented by Sharpe (1991). He states that markets can only clear when
the expected pre-cost return to investors in actively managed funds equals the
expected return in alternative investment opportunities.
4The possible non-normalities in the fund returns is not the only reason why bootstrapping
is a more accurate method to determine statistical significance. As the coe cients in the multi-
period model are averaged over eleven yearly coe cients, we have to apply a bootstrap approach
to derive the corresponding p-value for the average alpha and betas.
5See Appendix 3 for a summary of fund fees in our sample.
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Table 4
Regression Results on the Equally Weighted Portfolio
The table reports the results of the regression on the equally weighted portfolio for both
the single-period and multi-period version of the 4-factor model. The first and fifth column
presents the coe cients for the estimates of alpha and the loadings of the four factor-
mimicking portfolios for the two models. Additionally, the table reports the R-squared
and the Durbin-Watson statistic. The second and third column reports the t-statistic and
the p-value given by the standard t-test. Column four and six reports the bootstrapped
p-values for the two models.
Single-Period Model Multi-Period Model
Bootstrapped Bootstrapped
Coe cients t-statistic p-value p-value Coe cients p-value
Alpha  0.725  0.390 0.652 0.350  1.903 0.150
MKT 0.930 121.550 0.000 0.000 0.909 0.000
SMB 0.004 0.485 0.314 0.314 0.023 0.009
HML  0.001  0.218 0.586 0.424 0.007 0.175
PR1YR  0.044  7.177 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.297
R2 0.933 0.959
DW 2.094 2.084
Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of alphas, which is obtained by regressing
on each of the 64 funds in our dataset. From the figure, the slight negative shift in
alpha when regressing on the multi-period model compared to single-period model
is evident. Our set does not have a su cient cross-sectional size to conclude about
the distribution of these alphas. However, the histograms indicate some clustering
in the tails, i.e. there seems to be both superior and inferior performers compared
to the equally-weighted portfolio. The question is whether managers of funds that
exhibit positive (negative) alpha possess superior (inferior) skills, or if the alpha
distribution is generated purely by chance. This will be addressed in the following
subsection.
3.3.2 Separating Luck from Skill
From the distribution of individual alphas in the previous section, we find that there
are some funds who are performing well (right tail) and some are performing poorly
(left tail). This might be the case purely by chance or as a result of either superior
or inferior managerial skills. To illustrate an example, consider a hypothetical
database of 1,000 mutual funds. Performing regressions on each of the funds’ return
series with the 4-factor model, which does not explain return variation perfectly,
one should expect that some funds portray alpha significantly di↵erent from zero
purely by chance. Our objective is to separate luck from skill in performance using
a bootstrap method similar to Fama and French (2010) and Kosowski et al. (2006).
In the following, we apply the multi-period 4-factor model.
We find that the alpha of top and bottom performers cannot be attributed
to chance alone. That is, the fund managers possess skills that a↵ect the overall
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Figure 3. Alpha distribution for the multi-period and single-period model.
The figure displays the alpha distribution of the 64 funds in our sample for both the
multi-period and single-period version of the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. Each fund
alpha is estimated using daily data for as long as the fund was active within the sample
period (2000-2010). The bars represent the number of fund alphas within the given bin,
i.e. within ±0.5% of the alpha given by the x-axis.
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performance of the funds. This is evident from Figure 4. We see that the bottom
performing funds from the true data set lies in the left tail of the distribution of
bottom funds obtained from the bootstrap simulation. This indicates that these
funds may possess some negative attributes that a↵ect their performance. Mean-
while, the opposite is the case for the top performing funds. While we cannot reject
that the single top performing fund delivers positive alpha purely by chance, there
exist clusters of top performing funds that deliver positive alpha due to managerial
skills.
To confirm that there exist skills (and lack thereof) amongst fund managers,
we report the probabilities that the estimated alphas of the top and bottom fund
portfolios could occur purely by chance in Table 5. From the table we can conclude,
at least on a 5% significance level, that the top and bottom portfolios of funds
indeed are managed by skilled and unskilled managers, respectively. Ranking the
funds according to the t-statistic yields approximately similar results.6
Table 5
Performance of Top and Bottom Funds
The table reports the performance, i.e. alpha, of the single top- and bottom fund, as well
as the performance of the portfolios of the 5% and 10% top- and bottom funds. Column
one and three reports in percent per year the alpha of the top and bottom funds when
the funds are ranked according to the alpha and the alpha t-statistic, respectively. The
second and fourth column reports the p-value given by the bootstrap simulations. All
alphas in the table are significant at least on a 5% level, except for the single top fund.
Ranked on Alpha Ranked on T-Statistic
Alpha p-value Alpha p-value
Top fund 8.17 0.334 5.74 0.581
Top 5% 6.44 0.011 6.44 0.012
Top 10% 4.46 0.034 4.46 0.031
Bottom fund  17.76 0.011  18.81 0.004
Bottom 5%  16.53 0.000  17.18 0.000
Bottom 10%  12.45 0.000  12.45 0.000
One must keep in mind that the fund return dataset is net of fees, so that
one should expect a negative shift from zero in both the estimated alphas and
the bootstrapped alpha distributions that is equal to the average management fee
if one truly believes that the equilibrium accounting theory is valid. This could
explain some of the relative stronger rejection of the null for the bottom funds. For
example, if we add the average management fee of 1.69% back to the top fund, the
corresponding p-value is reduced to 0.147.
3.3.3 Market Timing and Stock-Picking Abilities
Wermers (2000) argue that abnormal performance that cannot be explained by luck
may be due to either stock-picking skill, market timing, expense levels, trading
6For added detail on this ranking method, see Appendix 4.
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Figure 4. Estimated true alphas versus bootstrapped alpha distributions for
individual funds. This figure plots kernel density estimates of the bootstrapped uncon-
ditional 4-factor model alpha distributions (solid line). To produce the distribution of the
alpha estimates, we first create random returns given by the residuals in the in the regres-
sion on the actual return data. Then, we generate 10,000 alpha estimates from the OLS
regression on those random returns. The x-axis shows the alpha performance measure per
year and the y-axis show the kernel density estimate. The vertical dotted line shows the
actual (estimated) fund alpha. The fund portfolios are ranked on alpha values, where the
highest ranked fund has the highest estimated alpha over the sample period. The same
ranking is performed on the bootstrapped alphas to create bootstrapped portfolios.
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styles or a combination of the four. Trading styles is not a likely explanatory
variable of performance in our case, since we are only including Norwegian equity
funds in our dataset and control for the most common trading styles by applying
the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model. Further, if fee levels vary significantly across
funds, funds with low fees are more likely to form a winner portfolio than funds
charging higher fees. We do not have access to the fee structure of the defunct
funds (which are more often than not underperformers), thus we cannot investigate
whether expense level is a determinant of performance. However, in their search
for variations in managerial skills in European equity funds, Abinzano et al. (2010)
find that their results remain unexplained by fee variations. In light of this, we
investigate whether the performance that cannot be explained by luck alone is due
to market timing abilities or stock-picking abilities.
It is possible that the fund managers, by adjusting their portfolio’s market
exposure, may generate superior performance by timing the market correctly. This
would imply that the fund managers are capable of correctly assessing the direction
of market (i.e., whether bull or bear). In case they do, they would be positioning
their portfolios accordingly. If a mutual fund manager increases (decreases) a
portfolio’s exposure to the market in advance of positive (negative) excess market
returns, the portfolio’s risk adjusted returns will outperform its market return
benchmark. Conversely, a manager could have superior knowledge on a selection
of stocks by processing and analyzing information, and thereby obtain stock-picking
abilities.
We evaluate the market timing ability using the Treynor and Mazuy (1966)
(TM) approach:
ri,t = ↵i +
X
j
 i,j rj +  i r
2
m + ✏i,t (9)
and the Henriksson and Merton (1981) (HM) model:
ri,t = ↵i +
X
j
 i,j rj +  iItrm + ✏i,t (10)
In TM, market timing is measured by adding a squared market return factor. It
captures the convex (concave) relationship between market- and fund return that
would occur if a fund manager is timing (mistiming) the market. HM uses a more
discrete approach, where It is equal to 1 (0) when the market return is positive
(negative). Thus,  i measures the degree of market timing ability. In both TM and
HM, ↵i is interpreted as risk-adjusted return controlled for market timing ability.
That is, a positive (negative) alpha can be interpreted as superior (inferior) stock-
picking skills.
The TM and HM equations’ objective is to describe the nonlinear relationship
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between the market return and the fund portfolio return. TM assume that the fund
managers adjust their leverage towards the market proportionally to the predicted
market return, equivalent to  i rm. However, HM assume that fund managers
operate with thresholds when attempting to time the market, implying discrete
adjustments in risk compared to the TM model’s continuous risk adjustment. Kon
and Jen (1979) provide empirical results which suggest that fund managers adjust
their portfolios with discrete changes in their risk levels, an indication that the HM
model might be better specified.
HM’s and TM’s measures of market timing have been subject of critique in many
recent papers. Ferson and Schadt (1996) find negative market timing coe cients
for the unconditional TM and HM models, but not as negative results for the
conditional versions of the models. They argue that the negative trend in market
timing coe cients are most likely due to biases in the performance models. Bollen
and Busse (2005) argue that funds exhibit short term market timing ability, but
that these coe cients are perversely negative in a long term evaluation window,
and relate this to the positive covariance between return and investor cash flow.
Warther (1995) discusses the cash flow issue of mutual funds, where fund betas are
pulled downwards by high temporary cash positions due to increased cash inflows
to the mutual fund market in bull markets. Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986)
introduce two e↵ects that could lead to over- or underestimation of market timing.
One is the dynamic trading e↵ect, which arises due to certain dynamic trading
strategies implemented by mutual funds, such as volatility hedging strategies which
would lead to a downward bias of the market timing coe cient. The other is the
passive timing e↵ect, which refers to the fact that the returns of a passive portfolio
can also be nonlinearly related to market returns.
In light of the arguments above, we are therefore not explicitly interested in the
individual fund market timing coe cients alone, but implicitly through the relative
di↵erence in these coe cients between the top- and bottom funds. We also allow for
variation in the stock-picking and market timing measures by applying the multi-
period model. An analysis by Kacperczyk et al. (2011) reveals that managers indeed
change their skillset focus (stock-picking or market timing) depending on economic
conditions. They find that market timing skills is more evident in recessions relative
to booms. For example, one could imagine that it is hard for a portfolio manager
to focus on the nuances of stock selection when the prospects of a recession keep
rising. Simply put, the macroeconomic impact would overwhelm the micro. We
find clear signs of a time-varying skillset,7 which emphasizes the importance of a
multi-period evaluation.
Table 6 reports the results from the two models. It is evident that the market
7See Appendix 5.
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timing coe cient are negative for all the fund portfolios. We suspect that the
market timing coe cients may su↵er from some negative downward bias, since
it is very unlikely that the fund market is consistently perversely mistiming the
market (Ferson and Schadt, 1996). The relative di↵erence between fund portfolios
within the data set controls for some of the common bias that could exist. As
shown in Table 6, the worst performing portfolios have significantly worse timing
coe cients than the top ranked portfolios. The stock-picking indicators, ↵TM and
↵HM , portray similar decaying tendencies.
Table 6
Stock-Picking and Market Timing Ability in Decile Portfolios
The table reports the stock-picking ability and market timing ability in the decile portfo-
lios using both the Traynor-Mazuy (TM) model and the Henriksson-Merton (HM) model.
The first column reports the alpha of the portfolios using the multi-period 4-factor model.
Column two and three report the stock-picking alpha and the market timing gamma, re-
spectively, by applying the TM model. The fourth column reports the stock-picking alpha
and the fifth column reports the market timing gamma, both given by the HM model.
All alpha values are in percent per year. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are
statistically significant on a 1% level, two stars (**) on a 5% level, and one star (*) on a
10% level.
TM HM
Decile Portfolio 4-Factor Alpha ↵   ↵  
1 (Top) 4.46*** 5.98*** -0.13 9.44*** -0.03*
2 0.31 4.12** -0.34* 11.29*** -0.07**
3 -0.33 1.84 -0.15* 5.79*** -0.04*
4 -1.02 1.91 -0.27* 8.97*** -0.06**
5 -1.72 1.33 -0.51* 7.84*** -0.07**
6 -2.31 1.28 -0.41* 9.91*** -0.08**
7 -2.94* 0.70 -0.57* 8.95*** -0.09**
8 -3.72** -1.25 -0.24 5.36*** -0.06*
9 -4.96*** -0.55 -0.88** 7.11*** -0.09**
10 (Bottom) -12.45*** -6.21*** -1.57*** 7.77*** -0.18***
Our evidence imply they there is stock-picking ability among top decile funds.
Due to the uncertainty of the market timing measures,  , we cannot draw con-
clusions on superior market timing ability among the top funds. Furthermore,
we find that the bottom performers are exhibiting worse stock-picking skills than
what could be expected by chance. As discussed, the TM and HM models could
exhibit some biases in the estimation, and it is therefore di cult to conclude upon
the presence of market mistiming among the bottom performers with confidence.
Nevertheless, our results imply that the managers of the bottom funds are to some
extent mistiming the market relative to the top funds.
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4 Persistence
In the preceding section, we argue that, in aggregate, Norwegian mutual funds
deliver negative alpha comparable to the fees they charge, and that there exists
funds that exhibit superior and inferior performance on an individual level due
to managerial skills. Now we investigate whether funds are exhibiting abnormal
performance that persists over consecutive time periods. To evaluate this, we apply
both parametric and nonparametric tests.
4.1 Performance Potential of Strategies That Exploit Short-
Term Persistence
Adopting the method of Hendricks et al. (1993), we evaluate the performance of
executable strategies that exploit persistence in performance during 2000-2010.
This way we can assess – both economically and statistically – whether persistence
is present in our sample of Norwegian mutual funds. In short, we evaluate the
risk-adjusted return from a zero-investment strategy of buying past winners and
short-selling past losers. An in-depth explanation of the method is described in the
following paragraph.
First, we rank all the funds based on their performance in the past M months.
Previous literature indicates that the evaluation period on which the funds are
ranked could be crucial for the outcome of the test. If the evaluation period is
too short, the outcome may be too noisy due to chance factors, thus managerial
skill may be hard to recognize. If the evaluation periods are too long, recent
abnormal performance may be unrecognizable. Therefore, we let the evaluation
period, M , vary from 1 to 24 months. Furthermore, the funds’ performance is
measured in three ways, i.e. according to their alpha estimated from the 4-factor
model, alpha t-statistic and return, in order to compare the results. Funds with
the highest performance in the selection period go into the winner portfolio (top
decile) and funds with the lowest performance in the selection period go into the
loser portfolio (bottom decile). These portfolios are then held for N months, where
N varies from 1 to 24 months. The daily return in both the winner and loser
portfolio is the average return of the funds in each portfolio. The portfolios are
rebalanced afterwards according to the highest and lowest performance based on
the past M months. This process continues until the end of the sample. This way
we obtain a time series of post-ranking average daily returns on both the winner
and loser portfolio. In addition we create a time series for the spread portfolio,
calculated as the di↵erence in returns between the winner and the loser portfolio.
Finally, abnormal return, i.e. alpha, is estimated for each (winner, loser and spread
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portfolio) of the portfolios using the multi-period unconditional 4-factor model.8
Table 7 reports the resulting alpha. To evaluate the statistical significance of our
results, we apply the bootstrap method as described in Section 3.2.
We find significant evidence of short-term persistence in performance when
funds are ranked on alpha. Rebalancing the portfolios every month results in the
most significant performance spread between the top and bottom decile portfo-
lios. For instance, rebalancing the portfolios each month based on the preceding
3 months abnormal return yields a 9.09% spread in yearly risk-adjusted return on
average. The performance spread decrease as the rebalancing frequency decrease,
but remains statistically significant for up to a 12-month holding period. After
that the spread become statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent
with the findings of Bollen and Busse (2005).
Kosowski et al. (2006) argue that he is able to control better for di↵erences
in risk taking across funds by ranking funds on their alpha t-statistic rather than
alpha itself. Our evidence shows that ranking on alpha t-statistic also yield sig-
nificant short-term persistence. Furthermore, we also find evidence of short-term
persistence when ranking on return. This is in contrast to the findings of Bollen
and Busse (2005) which report that the post-ranking performance spread disap-
pears when winners and losers are selected on funds’ return. Still, the abnormal
return generated from ranking on return is lower than those generated from ranking
on abnormal return. In our sample data, an investor looking to utilize short-term
persistence in fund performance should rank on past alpha in order to maximize
profits.
Figure 5 illustrates the post-ranking performance of the top and bottom deciles
for the entire sample period. Clearly, rebalancing monthly rather than yearly re-
sults in a larger performance spread. This confirms the finding of Bollen and Busse
(2005) that persistence in performance is a short-lived phenomenon. Furthermore,
we observe that the top decile portfolio in aggregate delivers abnormal return that
is slightly positive (negative) when rebalancing monthly (yearly). From Table 8,
we see that the aggregate alpha is statistically indistinguishable from zero. In other
words, we cannot conclude from this test that there is persistence among superior
funds.
The bottom decile portfolio is generating strongly negative abnormal return
for the entire sample period, indicating strong persistence amongst inferior funds.
Looking at Table 8, we observe that this result is statistically significant. In fact,
underperformance amongst inferior funds persists in our sample for two years.
These findings are in line with Teo and Woo (2001). Since the returns are net
of fees, some of the negative alpha can be attributed to fund fees. However, the
8We also apply the single-period 4-factor model to this test. The results are reported in
Appendix 6.
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Table 7
Performance Spread of Portfolios Formed on Lagged Performance
The table reports the aggregate performance spread of the top- and bottom decile port-
folios that are formed on lagged (a) alpha, (b) alpha t-statistic, and (c) return. For
example, for table (a), funds are ranked according to their past alpha, where the length
of the evaluation period, in number of months, varies for each row in the table. Then, a
portfolio that is long in the top 10% funds and short in the bottom 10% funds is formed.
This portfolio is held for a varying number of months, given by the columns in the table.
This process is continued through the entire sample, and the alpha obtained from this
investment strategy is displayed in the table. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are
statistically significant on a 1% level, two stars (**) on a 5% level, and one star (*) on a
10% level.
a) Rank on Alpha
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 5.69*** 3.18** 2.07* 4.01*** 1.50
3 9.09*** 7.21*** 3.67** 4.15*** 1.56
6 6.73*** 5.95*** 3.52** 4.68*** -0.49
12 7.78*** 6.59*** 6.45*** 4.28*** -2.21*
24 6.30*** 5.22*** 3.56** 1.93 2.84**
b) Rank on Alpha T-Statistic
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 4.81*** 2.97** 4.21*** 6.53*** 1.36
3 5.72*** 4.57*** -0.44 2.18* -0.50
6 5.26*** 5.03*** 3.94*** 4.61*** -0.32
12 7.57*** 6.22*** 6.50*** 3.26** -2.14*
24 5.43*** 4.77*** 3.78** 2.72** 3.02**
c) Rank on Return
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 3.93*** 1.26 -0.49 2.15* 0.01
3 4.79*** 3.93*** 1.32 2.00 0.57
6 4.82*** 4.88*** 2.06* 3.97*** -1.30
12 6.62*** 5.28*** 4.40*** 2.44* -1.50
24 2.44* 3.32** 2.09* 1.06 2.33*
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average annual fund fee is 1.77% and the maximum fee 2.00%, while the annual
alpha for the loser portfolio is -7.07% (when rebalancing the portfolio monthly
based on the performance the past 12 months). Thus, the fee charged by fund
managers cannot fully explain the negative alpha delivered by the inferior funds.
The negative alpha is therefore attributable to persistence in lack of skill, i.e. fund
managers are consistently either mistiming the market or picking bad stocks.
From Figure 5 we observe tendencies of co-variation between the portfolios.
This is especially evident in the period 2001-2002 and 2008-2010. This draws us
to conclude that the abnormal return for the top and bottom decile portfolios are
somewhat correlated through the sample period. Thus, there is some common
factor that describes fund returns that is not captured in the 4-factor model. For
instance, this common factor might be attributable to fund industry characteristics,
e.g. legal restrictions on how the equity funds are allowed to invest, or it can relate
to inflow and outflow to the funds. However, we do not investigate this issue
further.
Figure 5. Cumulative abnormal returns for the top and bottom decile port-
folios. The figure plots the cumulative abnormal return for (a) the top decile portfolio
with monthly rebalancing, (b) the top decile portfolio with yearly rebalancing, (c) the
bottom decile portfolio with yearly rebalancing and (d) the bottom decile portfolio with
monthly rebalancing. For all cases, the funds are ranked on alpha estimate for the past 12
months. From the regression using the multi-period 4-factor model, we obtain an alpha
estimates and a vector with daily residuals for each year. The abnormal return for each
day is calculated as the sum of the alpha for the given year and the residual for that day.
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Table 8
Performance of Top and Bottom Portfolios Formed on Lagged Alpha
The table reports the aggregate performance of (a) the top decile portfolio and (b) the
bottom decile portfolios. The portfolios are formed on lagged alpha with a varying length
of the evaluation periods (in number of months), given by the rows in the tables. To
create table a), the funds are ranked according to past (1-24 months) alpha. A portfolio
that consists of the top 10% funds are then created and held for a given number of months
(varying from 1-24 months), before rebalancing the portfolio. This process is continued
through the entire sample, and the alpha reported in the table is the aggregate alpha
from applying this investment strategy through the entire sample period. Table b) is
created the in the same manner, except that the portfolio consists of the bottom 10%
funds. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are statistically significant on a 1% level,
two stars (**) on a 5% level, and one star (*) on a 10% level.
a) Top Decile
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 0.53 -0.72 -0.97 2.21** -0.47
3 1.34 1.30 -1.30 -0.49 -0.79
6 -0.07 0.26 -1.88** -1.48* -4.01***
12 0.70 0.08 0.29 -0.63 -4.76***
24 1.43* 1.02 -0.38 -1.14 -2.58**
b) Bottom Decile
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 -5.15*** -3.89*** -3.03*** -1.80* -1.97**
3 -7.75*** -5.92*** -4.97*** -4.64*** -2.34**
6 -6.80*** -5.69*** -5.40*** -6.16*** -3.52***
12 -7.07*** -6.51*** -6.16*** -4.91*** -2.55**
24 -4.87*** -4.20*** -3.95*** -3.07*** -5.42***
In summary, we conclude that there exists persistence among losers in Nor-
wegian mutual funds. We find, however, no abnormal return on superior funds.
Still, we cannot conclude that there is no persistence in the performance among
the superior funds. For example, some funds may be exhibiting superior persis-
tence relative to the sample, even though they are not producing a positive alpha.
Therefore, in the next sections we perform nonparametric tests which rely only on
relative ranking of funds.
4.2 Nonparametric Two-Period Tests
In the previous section, we were not able to conclude about the persistence among
superior funds relative to the benchmark given by the 4-factor model. However,
there might be some funds that are persistently superior relative to the average
fund industry. In this section, we investigate persistence in performance using two-
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period nonparametric tests.9 By construction, these tests measure funds’ persis-
tence relative to the other funds in the sample. This allows us to draw conclusions
on whether certain funds perform consistently better or worse than other funds.
Specifically, we address whether funds are, over short-term horizons, consistently
ranked in the top and bottom portfolios. Eling (2009) argues that nonparametric
tests are more robust than parametric tests.
Following Carhart (1997) and Karoui and Meier (2009), we construct a con-
tingency table of the decile rankings over two subsequent intervals. The funds are
ranked based on their risk-adjusted performance and put into deciles over an initial
and subsequent time window. Then, we count the number of times a fund ends
up in one of the deciles over the second period conditional on its ranking over the
first period. We create a contingency table for four di↵erent time windows. The
contingency tables are displayed in Figure 6.
From the figure, it is apparent that winners are more likely to remain winners
and losers are more likely to remain losers. Consistent with our results in the
previous section, especially the bottom performing funds displays persistence in
subsequent periods. Our most convincing result is that of 1-month time windows.
There are two explanations for this. First, as we increase the time window our
sample data diminishes and we may have too few observations to find statistical
significant evidence of persistence. Second, a larger time window could lead to fewer
observations of persistence in performance since persistence tends to be a short-
term phenomenon (Bollen and Busse, 2005). Further, we observe from Figure 6
(a) that last month’s winners are frequently becoming next month’s losers and vice
versa. This is consistent with gambling behavior by mutual funds (Carhart, 1997).
We also perform the cross-product ratio (CPR) test to check whether there
exists persistence in our sample. Whereas Figure 6 presents the results visually,
the CPR test quantifies the statistical significance of the persistence. Similar to
Agarwal and Naik (2000), we denote those funds that are winners (losers) over two
consecutive periods WW (LL). Those funds that are winners in the first period and
losers in the second period are denoted WL, and LW for the opposite. The CPR
is the cross product ratio of the funds which show persistence to the funds that do
not:
CPR =
(WW · LL)
(WL · LW ) (11)
The null hypothesis in the test is that each of the four cases, WW, LL, WL, and
LW, is equally likely, i.e. there is no persistence in performance and the CPR is
equal to one. The statistical significance of CPR can be tested using the standard
9Performance evaluation in nonparametric tests is addressed using the unconditional 4-factor
model. Since the measurement windows are from one month to a year, the multi-period model
and the single-period model are the same for the purpose of nonparametric tests.
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Figure 6. Contingency tables of initial and subsequent performance rankings.
The figure illustrates to which degree the funds in our sample are consistently ranked in
two consecutive periods. Each plot (a)-(d) has di↵erent length of the time periods. The
top decile portfolio has rank 1 and the bottom decile portfolio has rank 10. It is evident
from the figure, particular in a) with one-month time windows, that funds are most likely
to achieve a subsequent ranking of 10 given an initial ranking of 10. The same can be
observed for the top decile portfolio.
error  lnCPR of the natural logarithm of CPR. The resulting Z-statistic is the ratio
of the natural logarithm of the CPR to the standard error of the natural logarithm:
Z =
lnCPR
 lnCPR
=
lnCPRq
1
WW +
1
WL +
1
LW +
1
LL
(12)
Corresponding to the standard normal distribution, a value of Z greater than 1.96
indicates significant persistence at the 5% confidence level. We vary the number of
portfolios from two to ten portfolios.
We find significant evidence of persistence in performance when we perform the
CPR test on our sample of 64 funds. The statistical significance of the test weakens
as the measurement horizon is extended (see Table 9), which implies short-term
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Table 9
Persistence Results from the Cross-Product Ratio Test
The table reports the Z-statistic obtained from the cross-product ratio (CPR) test with
a varying portfolio size (given by the rows in the table) and a varying time-period length
(given by the columns). The observed Z-statistic is compared to the critical value given
by the Z-test. That is, if the absolute value of the test statistic is greater than 1.96, then
there is persistence in the sample for the given size of the portfolio and time-window at a
5% significant level. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are statistically significant
on a 1% level, two stars (**) on a 5% level, and one star (*) on a 10% level.
Length of Time Window
Number of Portfolios 1 3 6 12
2 4.06*** 4.35*** 3.22*** 1.80*
4 5.27*** 4.64*** 3.30*** 2.34**
6 4.00*** 5.07*** 3.47*** 1.77*
8 4.09*** 4.18*** 3.25*** 2.09**
10 4.05*** 3.48*** 3.36*** 1.67*
persistence. We find persistence in mutual fund performance at short horizons of
up to six months significant at a 1% level.
Performing the CPR test on individual funds does not provide very significant
results. On the most, 10 funds portray persistence on a 10% significance level when
dividing into 4 portfolios. These weak results are due to few observations when
testing on individual funds opposed to the joint sample test, which make the CPR
test inappropriate for this purpose.
In summary, the results on the two-period nonparametric framework show
short-term persistence in relative performance among the funds in our sample. To
further investigate the presence of short-term persistence, we apply a multi-period
framework in the following section.
4.3 Nonparametric Multi-Period Test (Kolmogorov-Smirnov
Test)
Agarwal and Naik (2000) distinguish between two-period and multi-period non-
parametric tests that can be used to examine performance persistence. In the
first case, two consecutive time periods are compared to each other, while in the
multi-period case, more than two consecutive time periods are considered. In this
section, we complement our results from the two-period framework with a multi-
period approach. That is, we divide into winners and losers within every evaluation
period and count consecutive wins and losses for each fund throughout the sample
period. Eling (2009) advocates the use of multi-period tests to obtain more robust
results on performance persistence. As thoroughly discussed by Eling, both two-
period and multi-period tests may produce spurious results by the nature of the
tests. When dividing the sample into winners and losers, we have a very di↵erent
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treatment of very similar fund performance at the thresholds [see also Blake and
Timmermann (2003)]. This is most evident when dividing into only two portfolios,
but the same e↵ects arise when ranking into higher number of portfolios. Yet,
while two-period tests rely on a single threshold, multi-period tests depend on se-
ries of thresholds and will thus not discriminate funds with similar performance
that severely. Since we are now tracking the history of individual fund rankings
across the whole sample period, in contrast to only two consecutive periods, we are
better able to separate true persistence from chance.
Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009) both perform multi-period tests for
performance persistence of hedge funds by using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test. Their results coincide in finding a lower level of persistence in the multi-period
framework than under the traditional two-period framework, but argue that the
multi-period framework provide the most correct results, due to the robustness of
the KS test.
4.3.1 Implementation of the KS Test
First, we rank funds on alpha and t-statistic10 from a monthly unconditional 4-
factor model based on daily data. Based on this fund ranking we assign every fund
with the label W (winner), L (loser) or N (neutral) for each month. Funds will
be assigned with the label N if they are not ranked in either the winner- or loser
portfolio. In contrast to Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009), we do not
study our sample by only dividing into two portfolios. We also repeat the test for 3
to 10 number of portfolios. We investigate rankings based on both t-statistic alpha
and alpha, and perform the test on our entire sample as a whole, as well as for
individual funds.
Now we want to compare observations of consecutive wins in our (observed)
data with the ones in a random sample. The random sample is obtained by as-
signing funds labels W, L or N randomly.11 For the observed and the random
sample we construct arrays (array O for observed, and R for random, respectively)
counting numbers of consecutive wins. If a fund has a following history: WLWL-
NWWNLWWW, then the corresponding array for that fund is 1123. To obtain
10Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009) perform similar multi-period tests on hedge fund
performance, and apply the appraisal ratio as a performance ranking as well as alpha, to better
control for volatility in fund returns. Appraisal ratio is defined as the alpha divided by the residual
standard deviation resulting from a regression of the fund returns. The appraisal ratio accounts
for the di↵erences in the volatility of returns. When alphas have non-zero values, as is the case in
our sample, the appraisal ratio is proportional to t-statistic and both measures will then lead to
identical rankings (Lehmann and Modest, 1987). Therefore, for the purpose of the KS test, our
results on t-statistic are then comparable to the studies using appraisal ratios.
11Note that the original unbalanced structure of the set is conserved in the random sample.
That is, if fund i in our set is dead, or not born, in time t, then it will not be assigned with a
fund label. This will ensure that the test does not su↵er from biases due to set misspecifications.
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array O for all the funds, we simply merge arrays for individual funds. The KS-test
compares the empirical cumulative distribution functions (empirical CDF) of these
two arrays, and the test statistic D is obtained as the maximum distance between
the two empirical CDFs. For the given empirical CDFs, Frandom,n and Fobserved,n0 ,
the test statistic is:
Dn,n0 = sup
x
{Frandom,n   Fobserved,n0} (13)
Where sup
x
is the supremum of the set of distances. Note that this test does not
assume anything about the underlying distribution of the samples.
The test is formulated as follows:
H0: Consecutive wins (losses) in the observed data and in the random
sample are generated from the same CDF.
H1: Cumulative distribution function for the consecutive wins (losses)
in the observed data Fobserved,n0 lies below12 the cumulative distribution
function for the consecutive wins (losses) of the randomly generated
sample Frandom,n.
Therefore, rejecting H0 in favor of H1 indicates presence of persistence (That is, a
fund stays in the winner (loser) portfolio longer than can be explained by chance).
We apply the KS test both for the entire sample, and for individual funds.
To perform the test on the entire sample, we construct a joint CDF containing
the winner strings from all individual funds. When testing on individual funds,
the winner-strings are tested separately for each fund. This will provide insight to
whether there is significant persistence in the sample on aggregate, and if individual
funds exhibit stand-alone significant persistence. As the above-mentioned method
is constructed to find persistence among winners, we also perform the equivalent
test for loser funds to detect persistence in inferior funds.
4.3.2 Results on the KS Test
Our results from the testing on the entire sample are summarized in Table 10. We
find strong evidence of persistence among winners when we use monthly evaluation
windows. However, when we increase the evaluation windows to 12 months, the
persistence among winners disappears. This indicates that the persistence of su-
perior funds is a short-lived phenomenon. Moreover, our evidence imply that the
12We use one-sided test because we expect persistence in our sample. This is due to the fact
that a sample with persistence in performance should have less observations of a low number of
consecutive wins and losses (e.g. W and WW) than a sample without persistence. Hence, the
CDF of the persistent sample would lie underneath the CDF of the random sample.
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performance of inferior funds persist up to one year. This result coincides with our
findings from the parametric test in Section 4.1.
Table 10
Persistence Results from the KS Test on All Funds
The table presents the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on all funds
together. We report, with varying portfolio size for rankings based on 1- and 12-month
alpha, whether the entire fund sample exhibit superior and/or inferior persistence (See
Appendix 7 for results on 3- and 6-month alpha). ”Yes”, presented with the corresponding
p-value, indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no persistence in performance. ”Yes”
marked with three stars (***) is statistically significant on a 1% level, two stars (**) on
a 5% level, and one star (*) on a 10% level.
1-Month Alpha 12-Month Alpha
Number of portfolios Persistency in wins? Persistency in losses? Persistency in wins? Persistency in losses?
2 Yes**/0.036 Yes***/0.001 No/0.594 No/0.358
3 Yes***/0.002 Yes***/0.001 No/0.555 Yes**/0.036
4 Yes***/0.000 Yes*/0.062 No/0.397 Yes**/0.035
5 Yes***/0.001 Yes**/0.039 No/0.639 Yes**/0.020
6 Yes***/0.000 No/0.112 No/0.941 No/0.106
7 Yes***/0.000 Yes***/0.002 No/0.756 Yes**/0.016
8 Yes***/0.000 No/0.247 No/0.423 Yes**/0.023
9 Yes***/0.000 No/0.194 No/0.603 Yes*/0.057
10 Yes***/0.000 No/0.145 No/0.477 Yes**/0.011
Next, we investigate performance persistence of individual funds. Table 11
reports the results using 1-month evaluation periods. For comparative purposes,
we present the persistence result on individual funds when ranking on both alpha
and alpha t-statistic. Clearly, we find funds that consistently are ranked at the top
and funds that consistently are ranked at the bottom.13
Results on individual funds seems to highlight a di↵erence in the ranking criteria
of funds. Ranking funds on alpha results in more funds exhibiting persistence than
what is the case for the t-statistic ranking. This is most evident for the winner
portfolios, where the number of funds showing significant persistence is reduced
radically when ranking on t-statistics. Looking at the winner funds from the alpha-
ranking that are excluded in the t-statistic ranking, one finds that the majority of
these funds have an outspoken SMB strategy. Most of these funds, which are more
exposed to the SMB factor than the average mutual fund, do not appear in the
t-statistic results. T-statistics control for more volatility, and thus uncertainty, in
the alpha measurements. There might be some common risk elements for small
companies that are not accounted for in the SMB factor, or simply just the fact
that small funds have more non-diversifiable firm-specific risk. This could lead
13Our analysis using 3-, 6-, and 12-month evaluation periods reveals that this also applies using
longer evaluation periods (see Appendix 8 for an overview). Additionally, when using longer
evaluation periods (e.g. 6-month) we observe that some funds are both appearing as consecutive
losers and consecutive winners. This is consistent with the alternating tendencies observed in the
contingency table in section 4.2. However, one should bear in mind that longer evaluation periods
lead to fewer observations, which results in a less powerful KS-test.
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Table 11
Persistence Results from the KS Test on Individual Funds
The table presents the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on all funds
individually. We report, with varying portfolio size for rankings based on alpha and alpha
t-statistic, whether individuals funds exhibit superior and/or inferior persistence based
on monthly rankings (See Appendix 8 for results on 3-,6- and 12-month alpha and t-
statistic). The appearance of a fund number indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of
no persistence in performance for the given fund. Fund numbers in italic indicate SMB
funds. These are funds that have an outspoken strategy of investing in small or medium
sized companies, and may thus experience higher volatility in returns than the market
average. All results are on a 5% significance level.
1-Month Alpha 1-Month T-statistic
Number of portfolios Superior Funds Inferior Funds Superior Funds Inferior Funds
2 54 2,6,17,22,27,60 35, 58 17, 40, 58
3 36,53,59 11,27,50 36, 59 -
4 10,15,32,53,59 7,24,37 - 4, 40
5 10,15,31,53,59 7.37 - 38
6 7,10,15,31,50,53 37 53 3
7 10,15,31,46,53 - 53 -
8 10,15,31,46,53 37 53 -
9 10,15,46,53 - 53 -
10 15,46,53 - 46 -
to higher variance in the residuals, and lower t-statistics relative to the alpha
estimates, which would explain the absence of some SMB funds in the t-statistics
ranking. We should not however conclude that the t-statistic ranking is superior to
the alpha-ranking in our case. In general, there might be non-normal implications
in fund return residuals that lead to biased t-statistic rankings. Additionally, if
there exist common risk factors for the SMB-funds not accounted for in the 4-
factor model, then these possible non-normalities would even be cross-correlated,
and would lead to a biased t-statistic ranking for these particular funds. That is,
the t-statistic is supposed to control for noise in alpha measurements by dividing
with the standard deviation. However, if the estimate of the standard deviation is
biased, this ranking method would only lead to more noise.
Teo and Woo (2001) argue that it might be unwise to compare funds which have
di↵erent investment styles. Agarwal and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009) also control
for di↵erent strategies among hedge funds. If fund managers are restricted in their
investment decisions by the fund style, style persistence might be the reason for
the performance persistence rather than superior managerial skill. If, as discussed
above, the SMB factor does not fully capture the return commonalities of the SMB
strategy, this could lead to bias in the fund ranking.
Finally, the results from our testing on the full sample and individual funds for
di↵erent portfolio sizes give the following observation. When we divide the fund
sample in two, the bottom-half performers are more persistently losers than the
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top-half performers are winners. For example, as shown in Table 11, this is evident
from the six loser funds compared to the one winner (both from ranking on alpha).
From the testing on smaller portfolios we find the opposite. This shows that while
the funds in the bottom half alternate on being in the very bottom, the very best
performers are more consistently on the top.
Based on the multi-period nonparametric tests, we conclude that there exists
short-term persistence in our sample. Specifically, some funds exhibit persistence
in superior and inferior performance relative to the other funds in our sample. In
addition, inferior persistence seems to endure for longer time periods than superior
persistence.
4.4 Robustness of the Results on Persistence
4.4.1 E↵ect of Dying Funds on Persistence
Persistence testing can potentially be influenced by characteristics in returns for
dying funds. If terminated funds exhibit consistently inferior performance in the
last months before fund termination, possible implications in the persistence tests
arise. First, the inferior performance we find in our sample could to some extent
be explained by the behavior of the dying funds the last months before extinction.
Second, if the dying funds exhibit abnormal performance the last months before
extinction, the losing string (e.g. LLLL) of the dead funds could possibly have
been longer if they had not terminated, which in turn would mean that our results
on inferior persistence is even stronger. However, we perform a probit analysis
and find no significant relationship between performance and extinction. Size is a
significant factor for fund survival, but this has no implications for our persistence
analysis since alpha does not correlate with either size or fund extinction. See
Appendix 9 for regression results.
4.4.2 Sample Size Implications for KS Test on Individual Funds
To understand the significance of our results on individual funds in the KS test,
we test how many funds in our sample that are expected to exhibit significant
persistence in performance by chance alone. Specifically, it might be the case that
some of the funds would exhibit persistence only as a result of the sample size.
The test is conducted by performing the KS test on random fund samples. We
randomize our fund sample in 1,000 iterations, and then count the total number of
funds rejecting the null hypothesis of no persistence for the random fund sample
within each iteration. This is repeated for all portfolio sizes both for superior
and inferior persistence. This way we obtain the theoretical distribution of funds
rejecting the null by random for a given portfolio size, and find the corresponding
35
probability that the observed number of funds in our sample of 64 funds rejecting
the null is greater than what would be expected purely by chance.
Table 12
Significance of the KS Test Results on Individual Funds
The table shows the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test on 1,000 random fund
samples for di↵erent portfolio sizes with evaluation periods of one month. Column one and
three show how many funds that exhibit persistence for winners and losers, respectively,
in our sample. Column two and four show the probability that the number of funds
exhibiting persistence in our sample would occur purely by chance. Numbers marked
with three stars (***) are statistically significant on a 1% level, two stars (**) on a 5%
level, and one star (*) on a 10% level.
Superior Funds Inferior Funds
Number of portfolios Number of funds p-value Number of funds p-value
2 1 0.584 6 0.000***
3 3 0.022** 3 0.022**
4 5 0.001*** 3 0.006***
5 5 0.000*** 2 0.027**
6 6 0.000*** 1 0.187
7 5 0.000*** - 1.000
8 5 0.000*** 1 0.110
9 4 0.000*** - 1.000
10 3 0.000*** - 1.000
In Table 12 we address the significance of the winner and loser results when
testing on the monthly alpha ranking. From the probabilities obtained on, we
conclude that when dividing into 2 portfolios, the fund that appear as winner may
actually be there by chance. As for the losers, we should not draw any conclusions
upon the the results on portfolio sizes from 6 to 10 portfolios.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the performance and persistence of Norwegian mutual
funds using a dataset of daily returns from 2000 to 2010 free of survivorship bias.
To evaluate performance, we apply a multi-period version of the Carhart (1997)
4-factor asset-pricing model, as we find that the factor loadings vary significantly
with time. Following Kosowski et al. (2006) and Fama and French (2010), we
examine the statistical significance of the performance and persistence by means
of a flexible bootstrap procedure that avoids issues of non-normality in the return
residuals.
We find that Norwegian mutual fund investors in aggregate realize net returns
that underperform the 4-factor benchmark by approximately the fees. When we
study individual funds, we find that there exist fund managers that are able to
generate higher returns than what is expected for the given level of risk in the
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stock portfolio. For instance, the top decile funds generate an abnormal return of
4.46% per year on average. We reject that the superior performance is due to luck,
and conclude that the managers of these funds inhabit skills. Moreover, we find
that these skills can most likely be explained by stock-picking abilities. Similarly,
we find that there are funds that exhibit significant underperformance compared
to the benchmarks. For the bottom decile funds the risk-adjusted negative return
constitutes 12.45% per year on average. Our results imply that the managers of
the worst performing funds both are picking bad stocks and to some extent are
mistiming the market.
The search for persistence provides strong evidence of short-term persistence in
mutual fund performance. Buying last year’s top decile portfolio of funds and sell-
ing last year’s bottom decile portfolio yields an annual abnormal return of 7.78%
when the funds are ranked on past abnormal return and the portfolios are rebal-
anced every month. If an investor were to rebalance the portfolios every year, while
still ranking on past 12 months abnormal return, the annual excess return decrease
to 4.28% on average. Even when we form portfolios based on past excess return,
i.e. we rank funds on past return that is not risk-adjusted, we find the same pattern
of short-term persistence in the performance spread.
When we investigate the top and bottom decile portfolios separately, we find
that abnormally bad performance of the worst funds persist strongly. This is
consistent with Bollen and Busse (2005). We cannot, however, reject that the
excess return of the superior performing funds are statistically di↵erent from zero.
Thus, relative to the benchmark returns in the 4-factor model, we cannot conclude
upon whether the top performers exhibit performance persistence or not.
Furthermore, we perform nonparametric tests in both a two-period and a multi-
period framework. These tests allow us to infer whether funds are consistently
ranked as winners or losers relative to each other. The result from the two-period
tests imply short-term persistence for up to six months for the top and bottom
performing funds when the funds are ranked on past abnormal return. To provide
more robust evidence of short-term persistence, we complement our results from
the two-period tests with the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test [as described by Agarwal
and Naik (2000) and Eling (2009)], which evaluate performance persistence using a
multi-period approach. Now, we find that the performance of top performing funds
persist on a monthly basis. That is, the winners of the past month are likely to be
ranked in the top in the next month. Further, the results from the KS test show
that the worst performing funds exhibit persistence over longer time horizons. This
coincides with our result from the investment strategies of buying past winners and
selling past losers.
Successful active management of a stock portfolio requires that the market is
not e cient in the semi-strong form. That is, if the market is perfectly e cient, it
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is impossible for fund managers to exploit mispricing and create abnormal returns.
However, as argued by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), the markets cannot always be
fully e cient, i.e. there must occur periods of mispricing in the market. Our results
indicate that fund managers indeed are able to exploit these periods of market
mispricing, but still are not able deliver abnormal performance for its investors due
to the fees they charge. In other words, a fund investor could theoretically profit
from buying last month’s winners and short-selling last month’s losers. However, in
practical terms, the economic impact of this finding is questionable, since frequently
rebalancing the winner and loser portfolio would infer trading cost exceeding an
investors profits. As a consequence, Norwegian investors seem to be better o↵ by
investing in low-cost passive funds that seek to replicate the market return. At the
very least, investors should avoid those funds that have performed poorly in the
past.
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Appendix 1
Table 13
Regression Results on the Equally Weighted Portfolio Using the Conditional 4-Factor Model
The table reports a stepwise reduction of the conditional 4-factor model. The least significant information variable is removed in each
step. Column one reports yearly alpha. Column two to five represent the standard market-, SMB-, HML, and momentum factors. In
column six, the results for the lagged 12-month NIBOR rate are displayed. The lagged return on the oil price is shown in column seven,
while the lagged- interest rate and market return is represented in column eight and nine, respectively. The lagged interest spread is
calculated as the 12-month T-bill (ST5X) minus the 3-month T-bill (ST1X). In column ten, the R-squared checks for explanatory power,
while Durbin-Watson (DW,) testing for autocorrelation in the residuals, is presented in column eleven. T-statistics are presented in the
parenthesis. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are statistically significant on a 1% level.
Annual Alpha MKT SMB HML PR1YR 12-Month NIBORt 1 Oil Pricet 1 Interest Spreadt 1 MKTt 1 R-Squared DW
Model 1  0.052 0.879*** 0.001 0.001 -0.041*** 0.010*** -0.049 0.187 0.014 0.933 2.108
(0.028) (57.071) (0.140) (0.083) (-6.566) (3.760) (-0.276) (0.244) (0.072)
Model 2  0.048 0.879*** 0.001 0.001 -0.041*** 0.010*** -0.043 0.179 0.933 2.096
(0.026) (57.085) (0.143) (0.088) (-6.570) (3.761) (-0.271) (0.235)
Model 3  0.060 0.879*** 0.001 0.001 -0.041*** 0.010*** -0.046 0.933 2.097
(0.029) (57.096) (0.150) (0.091) (-6.576) (3.764) (-0.287)
Model 4 0.024 0.878*** 0.001 0.001 -0.041*** 0.010*** 0.933 2.096
(0.013) (57.216) (0.155) (0.087) (-6.583) (3.836)
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Figure 7. Normality check for the estimated distribution of alphas. The graph
shows a simulation of the joint distribution of annual alphas for the 64 funds using the
bootstrap method (residual resampling under a null hypothesis of zero alpha), compared
to a theoretical normal distribution under the same null hypothesis. The distribution
is obtained by resampling the residuals for each of the 64 funds in 10,000 iterations,
and regressing on these simulated time-series with the multi-period 4-factor model. A
kernel distribution of these alphas is depicted as the black solid line, while the normal
distribution is illustrated with a dotted red line. The x-axis represents yearly alpha in
percent.
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Appendix 3
Table 14
Fund Fee Summary
The table reports the average, median, minimum and maximum fee for the funds in our
sample that were alive as of December 2010. Specifically, column one reports the sales
fee, i.e. the fee charged by funds when investors buy fund shares. The second column
report the redemption fee, i.e. the fee charged when investors sell fund shares. The third
column reports the annual management fee charged by funds.
Sales Fee Redemption Fee Annual Management Fee
Mean 1.34% 0.36% 1.69%
Median 1.00% 0.30% 1.80%
Min 0.00% 0.00% 0.90%
Max 3.00% 1.50% 2.00%
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Figure 8. Estimated alphas (ranked on t-statistics) versus bootstrapped alpha
distributions for individual funds. This figure plots kernel density estimates of the
bootstrapped unconditional 4-factor model alpha distributions (solid line). To produce the
distribution of the alpha estimates, we first create random returns given by the residuals
in the in the regression on the actual return data. Then, we generate 10,000 alpha
estimates from the OLS regression on those random returns. The x-axis shows the alpha
performance measure per year and the y-axis show the kernel density estimate. The
vertical dotted line shows the actual (estimated) fund alpha. The fund portfolios are
ranked on alpha t-statistics, where the highest ranked fund has the highest t-statistic
over the sample period. The same ranking is performed on the bootstrapped alphas to
create bootstrapped portfolios.
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Figure 9. Illustration of time-varying market timing measures. The figure shows
the estimated TM market timing coe cients and stock-picking alphas for the top- and
bottom decile portfolios through 2000-2010. The fund ranking is based on the average
alpha obtained from the multi-period 4-factor model applied on the entire sample period.
The blue line depicts the average estimates for the top decile portfolio, while the red line
shows the bottom decile portfolio. It is evident that market timing and stock-picking are
negatively correlated, pointing out that fund managers shift their focus (micro or macro)
with time. The top portfolio is on average performing better both with respect to market
timing and stock-picking. In addition, the top portfolio has less volatility in the skill
measurements than the bottom portfolio.
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Table 15
Performance Potential of Portfolios Formed on Lagged Alpha
We replicate the procedure from section X were we investigate the performance potential of
exploiting short-term persistence. However, we now regress on the daily return series using the
single-period version of the 4-factor model. The table reports the aggregate performance of (a) the
top decile portfolio, (b) the bottom decile portfolios and (c) the spread portfolio. The portfolios
are formed on lagged alpha with a varying length of the evaluation periods. To create table
(a), the funds are ranked according to past (1-24 months) alpha. A portfolio that consist of the
average return of the top 10% funds are then created and held for a given number of months,
before rebalancing the portfolio. This process is continued through the entire sample, and the
alpha reported in the table is the aggregate alpha from applying this investment strategy through
the entire sample period. Table (b) is created the in the same manner, except that the portfolio
consist of the average bottom 10% funds. The spread portfolio [Table (c)] is created as a long
position in the top 10% funds and a short position in the bottom 10% funds.
a) Top Decile Portfolio
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 1.06 -0.30 -0.53 -1.50 -2.40**
3 1.77* 1.87* -0.48 -0.99 -0.95
6 0.33 0.40 -1.79* -2.00** -4.10***
12 1.39 0.62 0.32 0.10 -2.55**
24 2.08** 1.61* 0.49 0.03 -1.05
b) Bottom Decile Portfolio
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 -3.56*** -2.19** -1.79* -1.90* -2.28**
3 -5.69*** -3.90*** -3.22*** -4.11*** -2.14**
6 -4.33*** -3.09*** -3.30*** -4.34*** -1.84*
12 -4.65*** -4.14*** -3.82** -3.10*** -1.56
24 -2.48** -1.85* -1.67* -1.66* -2.68**
c) Spread Portfolio
Holding Period
Evaluation Period 1 3 6 12 24
1 4.63*** 1.89 1.26 0.41 -0.12
3 7.46*** 5.76*** 2.74** 3.13** 1.20
6 4.66*** 3.49** 1.51 2.33* -2.26*
12 6.04*** 4.76*** 4.14*** 3.20** -0.98
24 4.56*** 3.46** 2.16* 1.69 1.63
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Table 16
Persistence Results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test on All Funds
The table presents the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on all funds
together. We report, with varying portfolio size for rankings based on 3- and 6-month
alpha, whether the entire fund sample exhibit superior and/or inferior persistence. ”Yes”,
presented with the corresponding p-value, indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no
persistence in performance. ”Yes” marked with three stars (***) is statistically significant
on a 1% level, two stars (**) on a 5% level, and one star (*) on a 10% level.
3-Month Alpha 6-Month Alpha
Number of portfolios Persistency in wins? Persistency in losses? Persistency in wins? Persistency in losses?
2 No/0.116 Yes*/0.053 Yes**/0.029 Yes**/0.042
3 Yes**/0.013 No/0.142 No/0.100 No/0.118
4 Yes**/0.022 No/0.211 Yes*/0.071 No/0.171
5 Yes*/0.058 Yes**/0.020 Yes*/0.084 Yes**/0.045
6 Yes*/0.095 Yes**/0.024 Yes*/0.094 Yes**/0.031
7 Yes**/0.016 Yes**/0.029 No/0.150 Yes**/0.033
8 Yes**/0.011 No/0.274 No/0.255 Yes*/0.060
9 Yes**/0.023 No/0.126 No/0.240 Yes**/0.011
10 No/0.112 No/0.112 No/0.391 Yes***/0.009
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Table 17
Persistence Results from the KS Test on Individual Funds
The table presents the results from the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on funds
individually. We report, with varying portfolio size for rankings based on alpha and alpha
t-statistic, whether individuals funds exhibit superior and/or inferior persistence from 3-,
6-, and 12-month rankings. The appearance of a fund number indicates rejection of the
null hypothesis of no persistence in performance for the given fund. Fund numbers in
italic indicate SMB funds. All results are on a 5% significance level.
3-month Alpha 3-month T-statistic
Number of portfolios Superior Funds Inferior Funds Superior Funds Inferior Funds
2 61 29,37,41 16,61 37.41
3 16,54,59 31,37,41,45 54,59 37,41,42,58
4 7,24,38,54 37,41,45, 53 38,54 31,37,41,42
5 38,54 37,41,45 54 31,34,37,41
6 38,54 37,41,53 54 41,53
7 38,54 37,41,53 54 41
8 38,54 37,41 54 -
9 25,38,54 37,41 54 -
10 25,38 37,41 54 -
6-month Alpha 6-month T-statistic
Number of portfolios Superior Funds Inferior Funds Superior Funds Inferior Funds
2 10, 15,35,44,55 10,17,19 15, 44 4
3 6,10,53 10,41 - 10
4 10,15 10,15 - -
5 53 10, 15,41 15 15
6 10,31,53 10, 15,37,41 - 15,37,41,42
7 10,31,53 15,37,41,42 - 37,41,42
8 53 37,41,42 52 37,41,42
9 - 37,41,42 - 37,41,42
10 - 37,41,42 - 37
12-month Alpha 12-month T-statistic
Number of portfolios Superior Funds Inferior Funds Superior Funds Inferior Funds
2 14,44,48,54 4,11,39 20,44,54 39
3 36 - 36.44 -
4 26,27,54 53 54 37
5 54 37,41,42,53 54 37.42
6 54 37,41,42 - 37,41,42
7 - 37,41,42 - 37,41,42
8 - 37,41,42 - 37,41,42
9 - 37,41,42 - 31,37,41,42
10 - 37,41,42 - 31,37,41
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Table 18
Probit Analysis of Fund Extinction
The table shows the results from the pooled probit regression on fund extinction. The coe cients are interpreted as determinants for
fund extinction. The model is described as Pr(Y=1|X)= (X 0i i) where Pr denotes probability and   is the Cumulative Distribution
Function (CDF) of the standard normal distribution. The parameters   are estimated by maximum likelihood. The regression is based
on yearly observations, e.g. the size of the fund, and the return of the fund for each year. If a fund dies during the sample period, it
will be denoted as a dependent variable Y with value 0, and the corresponding independent factors will be evaluated for 252 days prior
to extinction. If a fund survives, the dependent variable will be denoted as 1. Positive coe cients imply that the factor is positively
correlated with fund survival. T-statistics are presented in the parenthesis. Numbers marked with three stars (***) are statistically
significant on a 1% level.
ln(Size)/Avg Size Alphat 1 Raw Returns/Avg Returns Raw Returns ln(Net Flows) Alpha
Coe cient 6.534*** -0.025 3.00E-04 1.00E-04 1.00E-04 -0.071
(4.376) (-0.729) (2.893) (1.131) (1.160) (-0.959)
Coe cient 7.869*** -0.033 2.00E-04 1.00E-04
(5.379) (-0.951) (1.930) (1.388)
Coe cient 9.405*** 0.003 1.00E-04
(9.861) (0.161) (1.768)
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Table 19
List of Mutual Funds
The list shows the fund names of all 64 funds in our sample, sorted by the date of
formation. Column one and three shows the fund number assigned to the fund, and
column 2 and 4 displays the corresponding fund name. Section 4.3.2 uses fund numbers
to describe which individual funds that exhibit persistence.
Fund Number Fund Name Fund Number Fund Name
1 Storebrand Norge 33 Romsdal Fellesbank Aksjefond
2 Avanse Norge (I) 34 Delphi Vekst
3 Nordea Vekst 35 Alfred Berg Norge +
4 Nordea Avkastning 36 Storebrand Verdi
5 Orkla Finans Investment Fund 37 Globus Norge
6 DnB NOR Norge (I) 38 Atlas Norge
7 Alfred Berg Gambak 39 Terra SMB
8 Alfred Berg Norge 40 Terra Norge
9 Avanse Norge (II) 41 Globus Norge II
10 ODIN Norge 42 Globus Aktiv
11 Storebrand Vekst 43 Nordea Kapital 2
12 Orkla Finans 30 44 KLP AksjeNorge
13 Danske Invest Norge II 45 Alfred Berg Humanfond
14 Danske Invest Norge I 46 ABIF Norge ++
15 Danske Invest Norge Vekst 47 Storebrand Norge I
16 Delphi Norge 48 Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Institusjon I
17 DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (III) 49 Nordea Kapital 3
18 PLUSS Markedsverdi (Fondsforvaltning) 50 Fondsfinans Aktiv II
19 Nordea Kapital 51 Storebrand Optima Norge A
20 Handelsbanken Norge 52 Holberg Norge
21 Carnegie Aksje Norge 53 DnB NOR SMB
22 Postbanken Norge 54 Pareto Aksje Norge
23 KLP Aksjeinvest 55 DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (IV)
24 Alfred Berg Aktiv 56 Romsdal Fellesbank Plussfond
25 Nordea Norge Verdi 57 Alfred Berg Norge Etisk
26 DnB NOR Norge (III) 58 Storebrand Norge A
27 DnB NOR Norge Selektiv (I) 59 Fondsfinans Spar
28 Storebrand Aksje Innland 60 DnB NOR Norge (IV)
29 NB Aksjefond 61 WarrenWicklund Norge
30 Pluss Aksje 62 Pareto Verdi
31 Nordea SMB 63 Landkreditt Norge
32 Alfred Berg Aktiv II 64 Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Institusjon II
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